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BOOK REVIEWS

Review of Invitation to Law and Social Science. by Richard Lempert
and Joseph Sanders, New York: Longman, 1986.
Frank Munger
Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence
State University of New York at Buffalo

The strength of An Invitation to Law and Social Science is the
coherent summary it provides of much of the best empirical
research in the Law and Society Association tradition (wellrepresented by the work appearing in the Law and Society Review
since it began publishing in 1966). The text introduces three
broad perspectives on legal institutions, entitled Desert, Dispute
and Distribution, focusing respectively on the assignment of
responsibility by means of rules and the process of adjudication,
on the functional fit between adjudication styles and social
interaction patterns, and on the instrumental effects of law,
viewed, among other perspectives, in light of John Rawls'
empirical standards for a just society.
But the book is more than a thoughtful summary. The
authors offer something daring and difficult, namely a description
of a "new discipline: law and social science" (p.1) that not only
summarizes much mainstream research but attempts "to construct,
wherever possible, new theoretical syntheses (p. 2)." The claim
that the book describes work within a new discipline raises
questions about the construction of a discipline, its substantive
focus, and its membership, questions which the authors do not
answer. Since the authors do not define the discipline, nor is this
project mentioned again, it might be passed over as an aside. Yet,
because the authors clearly attempt to speak for mainstream
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empirical research on legal institutions, the claim that they are
describing a new discipline takes on some importance. I will
describe their text, and return to the problem presented by this
claim at the conclusion of my review.
The book also attempts to create "new theoretical syntheses."
The new theoretical formulations take the form of sets of ideal
types -- for example, types of responsibility rules, types of case
processing "logics," types of adjudication styles, or types of legal
autonomy. Each (four-fold) set of ideal types is defined by
underlying dimensions of behavior which the authors describe at
some length. In concept, the text is ma-inly description and
elaboration of such dimensions of legal behavior, accompanying a
four-fold (or sometimes many-fold) crossing of these
characteristics to form ideal types which hypothetically identify
distinct legal practices or institutions. In describing the
dimensions of each set of ideal types the text draws not only on a
rich literature of empirical research, but also on jurisprudence and
moral philosophy, and on illustrations drawn from the authors'
personal experience. The mixture produces an informed yet
readily understood summary of research that should be accessible
to many undergraduates as well as to graduate students and law
students.
An illustration will make their method clear. The authors
introduce Part One, on responsibility rules and adjudication, with
the argument that an action frame of reference is essential to
understand responsibility. Using illustrations from common
experience, they show that an actor's intent and capacity to act
must be known in order to assign moral or legal responsibility.
The presence or absence of each attribute leads to different
determinations about responsibility under different circumstances.
Their discussion suggests a fourfold distinction between ideal
typical responsibility rules generated by all possible combinations
of intent and capacity to act:
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Rule Logics
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The table suggests a further "discovery," namely that the ideal
type rule logics are appropriate for distinct areas of legal doctrine:
crime, tort, contract and strict liability principles. They conclude
their discussion of responsibility rules by examining how the rules
are applied, that is, why responsibility is imposed on people
differently under different circumstances.
The mixture of an empirical analysis of the role of actor
orientations and the discussion of system justifications is a useful
device in an introductory text. At the same time it suggests the
authors' strong interest in jurisprudence, manifested throughout
the book in the central place that they give research on the
accuracy of precepts in Anglo-American legal practice.
The ideal types used in the book to synthesize empirical
research are grouped in three broad areas, with a rather neat
central focus to each. In succeeding chapters of Part One, the
ideal type responsibility rules are contrasted with ideal types of
case processing -- called case logics. In daily life, rules and events
are linked by a process which the authors call typification, by
which specific instances are determined to be members of a more
general class. Ideal type case logics describe how typification is
done in legal settings. Two features of attributing responsibility
to people are used to distinguish the ideal types: the quality of
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adjudication (the extent of factual detail required for attributing
responsibility), and the perspective of those judging attribution
(the actor's or an observer's). Quality of adjudication is further
subdivided into uniqueness (the importance of fine-grained detail
in rule application), and extensiveness (the scope of the search for
relevant evidence), which resonate with the legal concepts familiar
to any Evidence teacher as materiality and relevance.
Identifying "deep" and "shallow" case logics as ideal types
allows the authors to accomplish several goals very neatly. First,
they are able to describe differences in case processing in
different legal settings, and to describe the strong historical
tendencies toward shallower case logics. Second, they describe
research on how effectively trial procedures produce extensive
fact inquiry (i.e., "deep" case logic) and how attentive juries are to
the kind of fact inquiry that a given responsibility rule entails.
Finally, the authors are able to describe a tension between the
case logic that the structure (and ethics) of responsibility rules
entail and the shallower case logics that have tended to be adopted
in practice. This tension is described both as an unintended
consequence of the widespread conditions that incline case
disposition toward quick and easy settlement, and, as a product of
changing societal priorities in certain cases, such as workmen's
compensation and no-fault auto tort liability reform. Summarized
in this way, Part One is seen to be an extended argument about
the relationships among a few major characteristics of
adjudication in the Anglo-American tradition.
Parts Two and Three have similar underlying structures. In
Part Two, the focus is the fit between the predominant types of
relationships between parties to disputes and the adjudication
style of a society. With many qualifications, the authors argue
that across societies there is a tendency for patterns of social
interaction and adjudication styles to converge. They define four
ideal typical dispute settlement styles, which differ according to
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the scope of the issues that a forum is empowered to examine (i.e.
a forum limited to issues versus a forum concerned with all
aspects of the relationship between the parties) and the scope of
the remedy which the forum may impose (i.e. a remedy limited to
winner-take-all, versus a remedy involving multi-dimensional
compromise). The authors argue, following a well-trodden path in
anthropology, that the opposing ideal types, "binary-decision" and
"relationship-settlement" tend, with qualifications, to be typical of
modern and pre-modern societies respectively.
The use of ideal types, rather than causal arguments, allows
a comfortable exploration of deviant cases, the tribal society with
a binary-decision, a legalistic judicial system, as well the instances
of relationship-settlement type dispute resolution in a modern
society. Among the latter are grouped some well-known case
studies, including the settlement of business contractual
relationships described by Stewart Macaulay, and the structure of
street encounters between police and juveniles described by Egon
Bittner.
As in Part One, an important discovery is that a tension
exists between what the authors see as an overriding system logic,
which makes a particular adjudication style appropriate for the
society given its orientations toward responsibility and its
dominant modes of social interaction, and the practical constraints
on the actions of persons in particular roles within the system.
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The failure of attempts to reform the system of adjudication,
specifically the small claims court and juvenile court movements,
are used to illustrate the consequences of an inappropriate match
between an adjudication style and the relationship between
parties. The issue-settlement style of small claims courts (so-called
because problems which are technically appropriate for a narrow,
binary decision are diverted in the belief that a compromise will
satisfy both parties at lower cost than formal adjudication) failed
because most cases are winner-take-all conflicts in which the more
powerful party has no motive to compromise. The relationshipdecision style of juvenile courts (so-called because of the broad
inquiry permitted the court in deterring a narrow issue -delinquency or non-delinquency) failed because the judge lacked
the capacity to conduct a flexible inquiry in the therapeutic
manner that court reformers envisioned.
In Part Three, the authors set more explicit standards for
their mixed jurisprudential and theoretical enterprise of
evaluating the success of the legal system in achieving justice.
John Rawls' Theory of Justice helps them frame the empirical
issues by defining justice in familiar terms as the achievement of
liberty and equality. Rawls explicitly raises questions about the
dimensions of "liberty" and the meaning of "equality," and focuses
particular attention on the conditions under which members of a
society can choose and sustain just institutions. Two of the best
chapters of Invitation are devoted to the relationship between the
law and the capacity for private and public action for social
change to achieve justice. Chapter Ten builds on Mancur Olsen's
analysis of problems of collective action, tracing the legal history
of corporations and labor unions as examples of those problems
and the attempts to solve them by changing the law. The authors
discuss the asymmetry of problems of collective action for these
opposed interest groups and the tension it creates between private
collective action and democratic political representation. Chapter
Eleven provides a nice review of the "capability problem" in civil
rights reform, contrasting, and explaining in structural terms, the
relative success of voting rights legislation reform with the meager
results of civil rights legislation in the areas of school
desegregation and employment.
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The concluding chapters of Part Three return to the main
theme, the achievement of justice under contemporary legal
institutions. Presuming the importance of legislative autonomy
and judicial neutrality for any ideally just system, the authors are
concerned in part with the reasons why contemporary legislatures
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and judges can not function in this way. The thrust of their
concern, however, is not an empirical explanation of contemporary
politics, but rather a concern about the compatibility of
underlying value orientations with social change. Like Rawls, the
authors consider hypothetical societies displaying different legal
and social characteristics. The ideal types, generated by
combining hypothetical societies with different levels of social
equality and judicial/legislative autonomy suggest to them reasons
for the tensions, instability and likelihood that particular types
will be transformed. The characteristics of each type are
identified empirically, but also ideologically. In Anglo-American
political and legal ideology, society faces the dilemma that
inequality can not be addressed without violating a fundamental
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political value liberty. The authors' empirical inquiry is, thus,
constructed upon the basis of value orientations presumed to
characterize law in each ideal type society. The conclusions they
draw about the role that law will play in achieving justice are
premised on the society's commitment to those values. Since the
purpose of the hypothetical inquiry is to illuminate the prospects
for change in our own society (rather than to explain variation
across existing societies), the discussion is actually a way of laying
bare the consequences of a commitment to particular values
underlying the authors' own view of our society, a commitment
which, like their commitment to particular qualities of
adjudication in Part One, and their focus on the functional role of
adjudication in Part Two, affects the questions they ask and the
answers they propose.
This rather extensive (though not exhaustive) review of the
contents of An Invitation to Law and Social Science seemed to me to
be necessary to expose both its strengths and weaknesses. At its
best, it provides an elegant summary of mainstream research. Yet,
throughout I found it flawed by its implicit values and the
sequence of implicit arguments which guide, and limit, the
presentation of social science research on legal institutions.
Let me evaluate the book first as a text. I have used it twice
to teach a seminar to law students. Although many of the law
students felt quite comfortable with much of the research
summarized in the first part of the book (for reasons I will discuss
below), they frequently felt uncomfortable with the conceptual
schemes used to integrate it. One of the primary, if subtly
articulated, purposes of the book is to invite further research.
The text itself, however, does not guide a reader toward this
objective. Alternative conceptualizations are not considered, nor
are open questions highlighted and possible methods of exploring
them suggested. The reader nowhere becomes familiar with the
methodological concept of an hypothesis.
The difficulty which my students had applying what they
learned by reading this text is evidence of two serious problems.
The first is that the text presents a curious view of social science
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inquiry. Granted the authors are entitled to favor certain theories
which appeal to them. However, social science must begin with
the acknowledgement that alternative conceptualizations are not
only possible, but correct. Much of the history of philosophy and
social science has been about starting points. This book is
organized in a way which not only conceals that fact, but actually
creates the opposite impression. Further, the text leaves "society"
in the background. Legal institutions are presented as if they
have an intrinsic nature, and are embedded in uniform cultures
which bear a definite relationship to the form of the legal
institution. In fairness, the book does not purport to survey all
research on law and social science or all points of view. Yet, the
presentation of material, and the values it reflects are subtle, not
explicit, and the student new to this field may be misled.
Second, much of the book has a thinly disguised bias, raising
questions, ironically, about its appropriateness as a first text in
law and social science. The intrinsic character of legal
institutions will be recognized by any American law student.
Concepts with which law students are familiar become the basis
for social science without considering alternatives. Alternative
conceptualizations of the role of law in society, in politics, in
social control, in socialization, in conflict are not reviewed.
Rather, the impression is that the authors believe that empirical
inquiry may begin from the obvious, intrinsic features of legal
institutions. This suggests that their social science is accepted by
consensus and is value free, neither of which is true.
The theory of legal institutions presented and examined in
the text is the official theory drawn from legal ideology. This
observation does not detract from the authors' attempt to subject
the claims of this theory to the test of empirical research. But, I
believe that the implicit jurisprudence of the book seriously limits
the presentation of social science research. In Part One, the focus
is narrowed to research on the effectiveness of institutional roles
on their own terms, -- do juries follow rules, do common law
advocates do a better job of fact presentation, do police,
prosecutors or defense attorneys focus on rule-guided typification
in the performance of their roles? The nature of the research
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tends to narrow the issue to the effective achievement of those
roles. The findings are important, but this type of social science,
like the authors' text, accepts the legal system's objectives as its
starting point.
Starting from the legal system's stated objectives one is
unlikely to ask about or perceive the full effects of social
structure in which the legal system is embedded, effects which
include systematic race, age and gender bias, as well as other
systematic effects of stratification and morphology which may
render adjudication incoherent unless understood in a larger social
context (compare Black, The Behavior of Law (1976)). Further, in
Part One, the system is exemplified as one that attempts to make
appropriate rational judgments. The differences in the
typification of racial discrimination in the North and the South
by the Supreme Court is explained in terms which suggest that
distinctions were appropriate and rule-centered, rather than
ideological or political. Examples of law reform are presented in
a pluralist framework that suggest that there was an achievement
of political compromise rather than class manipulation. A reader
may not be inclined to question these presentations at the moment
of reading because the authors do not present such conclusions
naively, but they are presented without alternatives.
In Part Two, the central issue is framed by the contrast
between problems of adjudication in modern and pre-modern
societies. There is now much work by legal anthropologists
suggesting that the supposed difference in adjudication styles is
simply not there. Moreover, in casting the question initially in
functional terms -- does the ideal type pattern of social relations
for the society fit the style of adjudication -- the authors relegate
the history of the struggle to create and control particular legal
institutions within societies to a subordinate role.
Their interpretation of other research in Part Two follows
this pattern. Macaulay's superb study of the struggle between auto
dealers and auto manufacturers over reforming franchise
agreements is used as an example of the higher rate of litigation
likely when business relations are not enduring. Yet, Macaulay's
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own account does not suggest that this litigation was relatively
frequent, and instead stresses the importance of the unequal power
of the parties and the legal system's tendency to preserve the
imbalance through doctrinal interpretation which undermined
dealer suits both before and after reform. The authors thus cite
the research for only one of many inferences which might be
drawn from it, and their account of the need for adjudication
fails to take into account Macaulay's observation that, as an
institution, law preserved the inequality of power and displayed a
preference for institutions which favored the economically
powerful. Indeed, this example reveals how threadbare the
continuing relations hypothesis really is, since the auto dealer and
auto manufacturer must surely be characterized as having a
continuing relationship (there being no alternatives), suggesting, in
accord with the anthropological research mentioned previously,
that power plays a role in maintaining many types of continuing,
relations.
Part Three reveals still more clearly the consequences of the
authors' failure to consider alternative perspectives on their
subject. Rawls' social theory accepts a pluralist view of politics,
in which each of many divergent interests must agree to make
distributive change practical, as well as legitimate. Because Rawls
and the authors accept this as an accurate view of contemporary
politics, the classic liberal dilemma, a choice between liberty and
equality, follows.
What if the present political system were presented as resting
on a less legitimate foundation, say a process of compromise in
which a particular class is prevented from mobilizing effectively,
kept from access to information which would expand the range of
political choices, and is thereby prevented from making
appropriate choices in its own interest? Lempert and Sanders do
not deny inequality of power. Indeed, the contradictory nature of
inequality -- as a by-product of productivity and as a quality of
society which makes justice difficult to achieve -- is central to
Rawls. Likewise, the degree of inequality of access to law making
is one dimension used by Lempert and Sanders to distinguish
among ideal typical societies. But a view which made class power
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a central feature of the kind of society we now have would lead
us to ask very different questions about the sustaining role of law.
Such questions are implied in critiques of Rawls (Wolfe,
Understanding Rawls. (1977)) and in non-liberal political theory
(Cohen and Rogers, On Democracy. (1983)). In this alternative
framework, the behavior of a relatively autonomous legal system
would be viewed as invidious to the extent the autonomy is only
apparent and as a valuable and remarkable cultural achievement
to the extent it resists dominant interests, but it can not be viewed
as merely passive. It must be viewed as complicit, an institution
which legitimates many injustices: racial, economic, gender-based.
Exploring this alternative view of law and justice must begin by
examining the way in which legal behavior systematically reflects
these inequalities in our society.
It is not inappropriate for the book to have a perspective or
for that perspective to emphasize the authors' view of what is
most important about the legal institutions of their own society.
In the end, however, I believe that view has also affected how the
authors present social science. Perhaps, in the quest for a new
discipline which could be distinguished from existing behavioral
science disciplines, the authors sought to ground their synthesis in
research which in some way treated the legal system as possessing
a special mission as an institution. This would explain both the
compatibility with jurisprudence and the failure to consider legal
institutions as simply further examples of general principles of
social organization such as stratification, complex organization,
ascriptive or kinship organization, and culture. It does not justify
presenting social science as having only one perspective on legal
institutions or failing to present social science as one particular
method, among many, of constructing social meanings.
Finally, I would like to consider the implications of the
authors' claim that they are describing a new discipline. What
basis is there for distinguishing their new discipline from other
social sciences? What issues are considered important within the
new discipline? What theoretical starting points have been
employed in the new discipline? These questions are not answered
by the authors. The new discipline is not explicitly defined, nor
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is it mentioned in the remainder of the text. The reader is left to
infer answers to these questions from the contents of the book.
The authors' suggestion that there is such a distinct
discipline has at least three unfortunate implications. First, such
a declaration is likely to legitimate narrowing the focus of
empirical research by limiting discussion of what constitutes an
important issue to members of the discipline. Second, there may
be a further tendency to believe that the discipline, through its
attention to legal institutions, provides a unique perspective on
behavior in the manner in which economics has been thought to
study distinct aspects of behavior, to its detriment in my view.
Third, and most extreme, definition of a new discipline may lead
subtly to developing an essentialist approach to legal institutions,
i.e. an approach in which legal institutions are known by some
essential quality or characteristic shared in all cultures that have
such institutions (and a fortiori existing throughout a unitary legal
culture (e.g. North America)). It is not clear how serious the
authors are about maintaining the existence of a new discipline in
empirical research or how, at a conscious level, its existence has
influenced their presentation. As I have tried to illustrate, the
text exhibits all three limitations. It is appropriate to attribute
these limitations to the perspectives of the authors, I think, but
not to the field of research which they attempt to define.

